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Abstract: Taiwan has been successful in controlling the spread of SARS-CoV-2 during the COVID-19
pandemic; however, without a vaccine the threat of a second outbreak remains. Young adults who
show few to no symptoms when infected have been identified in many countries as driving the virus’
spread through unidentifiable community transmission. Mobile tracking technologies register nearby
contacts of a user and notifies them if one later tests positive to the virus, potentially solving this
issue; however, the effectiveness of these technologies depends on their acceptance by the public. The
current study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network
tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google’s Bluetooth exposure notification system) among
four samples of young Taiwanese adults (aged 25 years or younger). Using Bayesian methods, we
find high acceptance for all three tracking technologies (>75%), with acceptance for each technology
surpassing 90% if additional privacy measures were included. We consider the policy implications of
these results for Taiwan and similar cultures.
Keywords: COVID-19; tracking technologies; SARS-CoV-2; contact tracing; Taiwan; public health;
health policy; privacy; privacy calculus
1. Introduction
Despite its proximity and close cultural and economic ties to China, Taiwan has
managed to arrest the spread of the severe acute respiratory coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)
disease responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic. Proactive policy decisions informed by
the Central Epidemic Command Centre (see Figure 1) [1], combined with public health
behaviors like hand washing, social distancing [2], and mask wearing [3], have limited
the virus’ impact to 540 total cases and 7 deaths in a population of 23.7 million (as of
20 October 2020) [4]. However, the highly transmittable and often asymptomatic nature of
the virus [5] means Taiwan may yet face another COVID-19 outbreak. Policy makers must
be informed of which non-pharmaceutical measures may be implemented without halting
the nation’s social and economic activities, and if these measures are likely to be effective
among those individuals most likely to spread the virus: young adults [6].
Young adults who frequently engage in social activities and present with little to none
of the SARS-CoV-2 symptoms [7] have been identified as driving the spread of COVID-19
in many countries [6]. Unknowingly, these individuals may act as “superspreaders” [8],
and appear to have played a role in the second and third waves of infections already
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impacting some countries (e.g., Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of
America) [9]. Manual contact tracing is an important and time-intensive process [10] that
relies on individuals remembering their location and contact history.




Figure 1. COVID-19 daily cases (blue), deaths (red), and key policy decisions (text) in Taiwan dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic within the period 23 January–11 June 2020. Collection dates of the 
current study are highlighted in green. In the time between 11 June and 20 October 2020, Taiwan 
recorded a further 95 cases and a maximum of seven cases per day. CECC—Central Epidemic 
Command Center. API—Application Programing Interface. 
Young adults who frequently engage in social activities and present with little to 
none of the SARS-CoV-2 symptoms [7] have been identified as driving the spread of 
COVID-19 in many countries [6]. Unknowingly, these individuals may act as “super-
spreaders” [8], and appear to have played a role in the second and third waves of infec-
tions already impacting some countries (e.g., Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America) [9]. Manual contact tracing is an important and time-intensive 
process [10] that relies on individuals remembering their location and contact history. 
Subsequently, these efforts may overlook community transmissions that occur be-
tween young adults at public events or on public services, thereby allowing the virus to 
spread unfettered. Mobile tracking technologies provide one method for rapidly identify-
ing community transmissions and reducing the likelihood of a second outbreak among 
young Taiwanese adults, while allowing policy makers to maintain social and economic 
activity. The following study identifies the risks, benefits, and acceptance of tracking tech-
nologies for COVID-19 among young Taiwanese adults.  
1.1. Tracking Technologies 
Mobile tracking technologies use GPS, Bluetooth, or telecommunication network 
data to identify a list of contacts with whom you have been closely located [11]. These 
contacts are either stored on a centralized server accessible by manual contact tracers 
working in the health department (centralized system), or locally on the user’s phone (de-
centralized system). If a contact later tests positive to COVID-19, their contacts will receive 
either phone-to-phone notifications (decentralized) or be notified by contact tracers work-
ing in the health department (centralized) [12]. 
Policy makers must understand the perceived benefits and risks associated with 
these technologies if they wish to gain the social license (i.e., broad public acceptance) [13] 
for their introduction. When disclosing potentially private information, people tend to 
weigh the benefits (public health) against the risks (data surveillance) in an internal “pri-
vacy calculus” [14–16]. Here, we describe privacy risks in terms of the uncertainty caused 
by the possible misuse of sensitive or private information [17]. With some technologies 
requiring vast public uptake to be effective (minimum tracking app uptake may be as high 
as 60% of the population) [18], public policy must aim to maximize acceptance by ensuring 
these perceived benefits outweigh these perceived risks. 
Evaluating the perceived risk–benefit profiles of a new health policy can be aided by 
the framework of the Health Belief Model [19,20]. This model identifies six critical factors 
Figure 1. COVID-19 daily cases (blue), deaths (red), and key policy decisions (text) in Taiwan during the COVID-19
pandemic within the period 23 January–11 June 2020. Collection dates of the current study are highlighted in green. In
the time between 11 June and 20 October 2020, Taiwan recorded a further 95 cases and a maximum of seven cases per day.
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Subsequently, these efforts may overlook community transmissions that occur between
young adults at public events or on public services, thereby allowing the virus to spread
unfettered. Mobile tracking technologies provide one method for rapidly identifying
community transmissions and reducing the likelihood of a second outbreak among young
Taiwanese adults, while allowing policy makers to maintain social and economic activity.
The following study identifies the risks, benefits, and acceptance of tracking technologies
for COVID-19 among young Taiwanese adults.
1.1. Tracking Technologies
Mobile tracking technologies use GPS, Bluetooth, or telecommunication network data
to identify a list of contacts with whom you have been closely located [11]. These contacts
are either stored on a centralized server accessible by manual contact tracers working in
the health department (centralized system), or locally on the user’s phone (decentralized
system). If a contact later tests positive to COVID-19, their contacts will receive either
phone-to-phone notifications (decentralized) or be notified by contact tracers working in
the health department (centralized) [12].
Policy makers must understand the perceived benefits and risks associated with these
tech ologies if they wish to gain the social license (i.e., broad public acceptance) [13] for
their introduction. When disclosing potentially private information, peopl tend to weigh
benefits (public he th) against the ri ks (data survei lance) in an internal “privacy
calculus” [14–16]. Here, we d scribe privacy risks in terms of the uncertainty caused by the
possible misuse of s nsitive r private information [17]. With some technologies requiring
vast public uptake to b effective (minimum tracking app uptak may be as high as 60%
of the popula ion) [18], public policy must aim to maximize acceptance by ensuring these
perceived be efits outweigh thes p rceived ri ks.
Evaluat ng the perceived risk–benefit profiles of a new health policy can be aided
by he fram work of the Health Belief Model [19,20]. This model identifies six critical
factors underlying succe sful public health policies: perceived ill ess susceptibility and
severity, policy ben fits and barriers, cues to acti n, and self-efficacy [19]. Putting aside
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cues to action (e.g., government advertising) for now, the remaining factors may be readily
identified for COVID-19 tracking technologies.
Using the Health Belief Model, we identified perceived COVID-19 susceptibility and
severity (COVID-19 risk), perceived tracking benefits (one’s own and others’ health), per-
ceived tracking risks (data security and privacy), and control (self-efficacy regarding when
tracking occurs and who has data access) as critical factors to gaining public acceptance for
COVID-19 tracking technologies. The risks posed by COVID-19 will vary with the state of
the pandemic (increasing or decreasing cases), and so too may the relative benefits and risks
associated with each technology (more beneficial when cases are high). However, some
technological features—data access and data control—may have a stable public perception
regardless of COVID-19 cases.
Table 1 displays how mobile tracking technologies vary in their risk–benefit profiles.
GPS locations are precise, but cannot be reliably detected indoors [21] where the virus
is likely to spread. Telecommunication network tracking is used as part of the Taiwan’s
“electronic fence” to monitor individual’s movements under home-quarantine [22,23] and
could be adapted to collocate individuals, however, location precision varies with the
availability of network towers [24]. Bluetooth tracking works in a limited radius [25] and
can preserve privacy through anonymous phone IDs, but only works if both users have
downloaded compatible COVID-19 tracing apps [12,26]. Similarly, data storage systems
offer benefits and risks: a decentralized system ensures data privacy and security, but at
a cost to assisting manual contact tracing efforts. Understanding how young Taiwanese
adults trade-off these risks and benefits when deciding if a policy is “acceptable” is critical
to ensuring policy makers don’t waste time and resources pursuing ineffective solutions.
Table 1. Tracking technologies for COVID-19 and their precision, risk to the user if data were leaked,
benefits in COVID-19 tracking, control over when tracking occurs, and who has access to the data.
App—mobile phone application.
Telecommunication
Network Tracking GPS Tracking Bluetooth Tracking
Precision 50 m–2 km radius dueto tower density [24].
5 m radius, but may not
work indoors [21].
10 m radius, can be
blocked by objects [25].
Risks Rough locations (e.g.,work and home).
Exact locations and
movements.
Phone ID is public, but
anonymized.












Gov or corporate apps
with the user’s
permission.




Establishing acceptance for tracking technologies will of course benefit Taiwan, but
may also benefit other countries that are culturally similar. Taiwan has shown different
attitudes to Western countries regarding privacy attitudes [27], their communal sense
of self [28], and approaches to governmental public health surveillance (e.g., compare
Taiwan’s rapid COVID-19 response and the sharing of public health records, to the response
by America, the United Kingdom, or Australia) [1]. These differences may make the
introduction of tracking technologies more effective in Taiwan and countries with similar
cultures, as public health may be viewed as more important than individualistic notions of
privacy and security [29]. As policy makers around the world seek solutions to the spread
of COVID-19, it is important that research reflects these diverse attitudes, as a health policy
that works in one country may not work in another.
To these ends, the current research fits within a broader series of investigations
determining acceptance for non-pharmaceutical solutions to stopping COVID-19. Cur-
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rently, this research sits at the vanguard of a series of ongoing investigations in the
United Kingdom [30], Australia [31], the United States of America, Germany, Hungary,
Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and Japan, preliminary analyses of which can be found at
https://stephanlewandowsky.github.io/UKsocialLicence.
1.3. Current Study
In April 2020, we asked a sample of young Taiwanese adults about their attitudes to
introducing three hypothetical mobile tracking technologies: telecommunication network
tracking, a centralized government app, and the Apple and Google exposure notification
(EN) Bluetooth system (more on this in the methods). We also assessed their perceptions of
the COVID-19 pandemic in Taiwan, and how acceptance for tracking technologies changed
with the inclusion of additional measures that increased the user’s privacy, security and
data control (e.g., a “Sunset” clause, local storage or opt-out option). This study aims to
inform policy decision makers about the effectiveness of introducing COVID-19 tracking
technologies in Taiwan and other Asian countries with similar attitudes towards health
surveillance, and the factors that most improve acceptance for these technologies among
young adults.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Overview
Four survey waves were collected one week apart during the COVID-19 pandemic in
Taiwan between 8 April and 29 April 2020 (see Figure 1). Surveys assessed the attitudes of
young Taiwanese adults to one of three mobile tracking technologies, in addition to a range
of constructs such as world views, trust in government, and the impact and perception of
COVID-19. Chinese and English versions of the surveys, data, and analysis code can all be
accessed at our Open Science Framework (OSF) repository, https://osf.io/tcqae.
Waves one and two examined two hypothetical tracking scenarios. The first was a
voluntary centralized government app that notified users if they were in contact with
an infected individual and shared contact registries with the health department to allow
manual contact tracing (“Gov App” scenario). The second was telecommunication network
tracking through which the government could issue quarantine orders and fines (“Telecom-
munication” scenario). These items were developed when a government app had not been
considered in Taiwan. Therefore, the tracking technology used by the government app was
left ambiguous although the scenario was phrased to intimate the use of GPS or Bluetooth
technologies. Participants were always made aware that the proposed technologies were
hypothetical in nature.
Waves three and four included an additional “Bluetooth” scenario describing the
newly introduced EN system proposed by Apple and Google. In this scenario, phones
exchanged contact information through a decentralized system, directly notifying a user’s
phone if a registered contact later identified as infected [26]. This scenario was added
following Apple and Google’s announcement to create an EN system (11 April 2020), and
data were collected before the app was launched (20 May 2020; see Figure 1). The EN
system has a notable advantage in that any app developed with the EN system can share
contact registry information. In this way, apps developed by different countries may still
communicate with one another.
2.2. Participants
Participants were 1087 Taiwanese adults aged 18 to 25 who completed a 10 min (waves 1–2)
or 15 min (waves 3–4) online survey, collected between 8 April and 29 April 2020. Between
these dates, cumulative COVID-19 cases increased from 376 to 429, and deaths increased
from five to six [4]. Participants were recruited through the online survey distribution
platform, Surveycake, and were reimbursed NTD $50 or could optionally be reimbursed
one course credit if they were a student of introductory psychology at the National Cheng
Kung University. Ethics approval for this study was obtained from the Ethics Committee of
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the Department of Psychology at the National Cheng Kung University (ethics code 108-072).
The study was conducted in accordance with the approved guidelines and regulations.
Due to the rapidly evolving nature of the pandemic, as many participants were sampled as
possible given immediate financial constraints and the need for rapid, informative data at
the start of the pandemic.
2.3. Design and Procedure
Figure 2 illustrates the survey design in each wave of data collection. Plain language
statements, consent, comprehension checks directly following each scenario, and free-text
responses at the end of the surveys are not reported. Immunity passports (waves 3 and 4)
will not be discussed in the current paper, and resilience and world view items will only be
presented as an appendix, proving among the least important items examined in this study.
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Figure 2. Survey design for waves 1–4. White boxes depict a block of questions with the number of
items displayed on the right. Black boxes display the scenario to which participants were randomly
assigned in a between-subjects design. Gray boxes illustrate judgments of tracking acceptability.
“Acceptability with other*” included a local phone data-storage option for the government app
scenario and the ability to opt-out of tracking in the telecommunication scenario.
After reading an information sheet and providing informed consent and demographic
information, participants were assessed for their psychological resilience using the Connor–
Davidson resilience scale (CD-RISC) [32]. This measure and associated results are presented
in Appendix A. Following this, participants reported their perceived risk from COVID-19
(items summarized in Table 2). Responses were made on a 5-point scale, where higher
items corresponded to an endorsement of the issue, (e.g., 1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely).
Participants were then probed about the impact of COVID-19 (Table 2), and in waves 3 and 4
were asked to estimate national fatalities and policy compliance. National fatality estimates
were recorded to compare fatality estimates in other countries that were examining this
item and will not be reported in the current study.
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Table 2. Items assessing the perceived risk from COVID-19.
Item Question Label
Risk 1 How severe do you think novel coronavirus(COVID-19) will be for the general population? General harm
Risk 2 How harmful would it be for your health if youwere to become infected with COVID-19? Personal harm
Risk 3 How concerned are you that you might becomeinfected with COVID-19? Concern self
Risk 4 How concerned are you that somebody you knowmight become infected with COVID-19? Concern others
Impact 1 Have you ever tested positive to COVID-19? Positive self
Impact 2 Has somebody you know ever tested positive toCOVID-19? Positive other
Impact 3 How many days, if any, have you been in quarantineor self-isolation? Lockdown days
Impact 4 Have you temporarily or permanently lost your jobas a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic? Job loss
Participants were then presented with one of three tracking scenarios. Tracking
scenarios are displayed in English and Chinese in Appendix B, and are summarized below.
The government app scenario described a voluntary, centralized COVID-19 tracking app.
Data would be stored in an encrypted format on a secure server accessible only to the
Taiwanese government, and would only be used to contact those who might have been
exposed to COVID-19.
The telecommunication network tracking scenario described mandatory mobile track-
ing with no possibility to opt-out. Data would be stored in an encrypted format on a secure
server accessible only to the Taiwanese government who may use the data to locate people
who were violating lockdown orders and enforce these orders with fines and arrests where
necessary (i.e., an extension to the “electronic fence” system already in use).
The Bluetooth (i.e., Apple and Google’s EN system) scenario described a voluntary,
decentralized contact tracing app that would use Bluetooth to help inform people if they
have been exposed to others with COVID-19. The government would not know the
identities of these individuals.
After reading one of the three scenarios, participants then completed a comprehension
check, selecting an accurate scenario description from a range of choices. Participants who
identified an incorrect description were excluded at analysis.
Tracking acceptability was then assessed after reading the scenario (1st acceptability)
and then again after responding to items querying the benefits and risks posed by the tech-
nologies (2nd acceptability). This second measure was taken as the primary “acceptance”
metric, as public acceptance in the “real world” is likely to change after considering the
implications of these technologies.
To assess acceptability, participants were asked if they “would download and use” the
government app, if “the use of [telecommunication network] tracking data in this scenario
is acceptable”, and if they “would use” the Apple and Google Bluetooth technology.
Items assessing the benefits and harm posed by each scenario are summarized in Table 3.
Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 = Not at all, 6 = Extremely).
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Table 3. Items assessing the benefits and harm arising from smartphone tracking. “The Govern-
ment” was replaced by “Apple and Google” in the Bluetooth scenario. Reverse scored items are
denoted by [R].
Item Question Label
Bfit 1 How confident are you that the described scenario wouldreduce your likelihood of contracting COVID-19? Reduce contraction
Bfit 2 How confident are you that the described scenario wouldhelp you resume your normal activities more rapidly? Resume activity
Bfit 3 How confident are you that the described scenario wouldreduce the spread of COVID-19? Reduce spread
Harm 1 How difficult is it for people to decline participation? Difficult to decline [R]
Harm 2 To what extent do people have ongoing control of their data? Ongoing control
Harm 3 How sensitive are the data being collected? Data sensitivity
Harm 4 How serious is the risk of harm from the proposed scenario? Risk (from tracking)
Harm5 How secure are the data that would be collected? Data security [R]
Harm 6
To what extent is the Government [Apple/Google] only
collecting the data necessary to achieve the
purposes of the policy?
Data necessary
Harm 7
How much do you trust the Government [Apple/Google] to
use the tracking data only to deal
with the COVID-19 pandemic?
Trust intentions
Harm 8 How much do you trust the Government [Apple/Google] tobe able to ensure the privacy of each individual? Trust privacy
Two follow-up items were asked if participants responded “no” to the second accept-
ability judgement. The first item asked if tracking would be acceptable under a sunset
clause where data were deleted after 6 months. The second item asked if tracking would be
acceptable if participants could opt-out of tracking (telecommunication network tracking
scenario only), or if data were only stored locally on the phone rather than on a government
server (government app scenario only). A second question was not asked in the Bluetooth
scenario.
Acceptability items were then followed by items assessing attitudes to introducing
immunity passports (waves 3 and 4) and political world views. World view items and
results are displayed in Appendix A and immunity passport items will not be discussed in
the current paper.
2.4. Data Analysis
Treating Likert-style responses (ordinal variables) as interval data assumes that the
perceived intervals between categories are evenly spaced (e.g., that the perceived interval
between responses “none” and “slightly”, is equivalent to the interval between “very” and
“extremely”). When violated, this assumption may undermine or invalidate parametric
analyses that treat ordinal data as if it were continuous. To bypass this issue, we chose to
model the latent categorical boundaries that underlie the ordinal responses using Bayesian
methods. Latent ordinal boundaries were estimated from a single fixed boundary location
(the lowest boundary) across participants and items, allowing for responses to be directly
compared across items. This allows readers to interpret differences within the data us-
ing both qualitative boundaries (Likert response categories) and statistically meaningful
Bayesian posterior estimates. Bayesian ordinal probit regressions were used to compare
Likert-style responses using the MCMCoprobit and HPDinterval functions in R packages
MCMCpack [33] and Coda [34], respectively. The Bayesian ordinal probit model assumes
that latent normally distributed variables underlie the ordinal responses, and divides the
latent space using one minus the number of response-option boundaries. Latent variables
are then modelled with reference to the lowest boundary which is fixed at zero (following
the method of [35]). Similar items and different scenario conditions were modelled together
to allow direct comparisons between variables with the same response option boundaries
between them (this will become clear in the results section; see [36] for model details).
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To estimate a latent variable, the Bayesian model samples a posterior distribution of
plausible means by weighing the likelihood of an observation against its prior probability
of occurring in the sample. These normally distributed samples follow parametric assump-
tions and constrain the effect of outliers in the sampled data, allowing the densest and
most credible region of data to be plotted and used to inform policy decisions. Practically,
this means that instead of testing a threshold of significance (e.g., p-value), we may directly
compare the 95% highest density credible intervals to determine differences in the data.
The MCMCoprobit function was run with one chain of 20,000 Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) iterations (including 1000 burn-ins) per variable, and a tuning parameter of
0.3 (the size of the Metropolis–Hastings step). Default uniform improper priors over real
numbers between -inf to inf were used for the mean and the boundary parameters.
Highest density intervals were determined for bimodal variables (e.g., binary “yes” or
“no” responses) using the bayes.prop.test function from the BayesianFirstAid package [37].
The bayes.prop.test function was run with one chain and 20,000 MCMC interactions
(including 1000 burn-ins). Default priors were used: a beta distribution (α = 1, β = 1)
corresponding to a uniform prior over the unit interval. Ninety-five percent highest
posterior density intervals (HDIs) were estimated on the resulting posterior samples.
3. Results
Anonymized data and analysis code are available for all waves at https://osf.io/tcqae.
As the reader will soon see, perceptions regarding COVID-19 were relatively stable across
the waves of data collection and there were relatively few new cases of COVID-19 during
this collection period (increasing from 376 to 429). As such, we chose to report our main
findings collapsed across the four waves of data collection.
3.1. Data Preparation and Demographics
Participants under the age of 18 or older than 25, participants that failed to pass a
comprehension check, or participants that did not complete the survey were removed
from each sample (see Table 4). The final sample retained across the waves was N = 957.
Demographic information is provided in Table 4. Across waves 2–4, 93% of participants
owned a smartphone.
Table 4. Sample sizes, demographics, and information source for COVID-19 in Taiwan for each wave of data collection.
Assessment Item Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Initial Sample 385 232 301 169
Removals Comprehension check 40 33 35 22
Final sample 345 199 266 147
Gender (%) Men 50.1% 52.8% 50% 53.1%
Women 49.6% 46.2% 49.6% 46.9%
Other - 0.5% 0.4% -
Prefer not to say 0.3% 0.5% - -
Age (years) Mean 20.46 19.94 19.8 19.86
Std. Dev 1.9 1.58 1.35 1.44
Education (%) Less than high school 0.9% 4.5% 1.9% 3.4%
Graduated high school 66.1% 76.4% 78.2% 81%
Graduated university 33% 19.1% 19.9% 15.6%
Information sources Newspaper 62.3% 68.8% 62% 59.9%
for COVID-19 (%) Social media 29.9% 23.6% 32% 35.4%
Television 5.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2%
Friends and family 1.2% 4% 3% 2.7%
Other 1.2% 1% 0.4% -
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3.2. Impacts of COVID-19
Across all four waves, 96% of participants reported as being under lockdown for an
average of 0 (SD = 2) days. Of the 957 participants sampled, 21 (2%) lost their job due to
COVID-19, 2 participants tested positive with COVID-19 and 9 participants knew someone
who had tested positive to COVID-19. In the final two waves, participants were asked
to estimate public compliance with government COVID-19 policy decisions, for example,
lockdown laws and social distancing. In wave 3 compliance was estimated to be 41% and
in wave 4 compliance was estimated at 44%.
3.3. Perceived Risk from COVID-19
Figure 3 displays the mean ordinal regression posterior distributions and associated
Likert-style responses for items querying people’s perceived risk from COVID-19 in each
wave of data collection. Risk items are described in Table 2. Error bars display the 95% HDI
and black horizontal lines illustrate differences where HDIs do not overlap. Over time,
participants viewed COVID-19 as “somewhat” harmful to others and were “somewhat”
concerned for their own health. The virus was perceived as “very” harmful to one’s health
and spiked during wave 3, corresponding with 22 infected naval officers disembarking
in Taiwan [38]. Although participants were “very” concerned for others, this concern
decreased from wave 1 to wave 4.
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Figure 3. Ordinal regression mean posterior distributions for items assessing the perceived risk from
COVID-19 for each wave. Black points display posterior means and colored error bars display the
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3.4. Perceived Benefits from Tracking
Figure 4 displays the mean ordinal regression posterior distributions and associated
Likert-style responses for items querying people’s perceived benefits from tracking in each
scenario (items described in Table 3). All technologies were perceived to be “moderately”
beneficial. Telecommunication network tracking was perceived as the most beneficial for
reducing the rate of contraction and spread of COVID-19. All technologies were perceived
to show similar benefits for resuming normal activities.
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3.6. Acceptability of Tracking Technologies
Figure 6 shows acceptability ratings under varying conditions. Baseline acceptability
ratings were measured after responding to the tracking effectiveness items, while the
remaining items display the additional acceptance conferred when additional privacy
measures were included. Baseline acceptability was very high (75–81%) and did not differ
meaningfully across the scenarios. Acceptability increased with additional privacy options
in the telecommunication and government app scenarios (up to 92% and 91%, respectively).
Acceptability only increased slightly from baseline in the Bluetooth scenario (81% up to
91%) with the inclusion of a sunset clause.
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4. Discussion
Over the month of April, 2020, we asked four samples of Taiwanese young adults to
rate the perceived risks posed by COVID-19, before rating the acceptability, benefits, and
risks associated with three hypothetical tracking scenarios: telecommunication network
tracking, a decentralized Bluetooth Exposure Notification system backed by Apple and
Google, and a centralized government app. Participants perceived COVID-19 as somewhat
to very harmful to their health, and were particularly concerned by the risk COVID-19
posed to others. The three tracking technologies were perceived to confer similar benefits
to public health and assisting in a return to normal activities; however, they differed in
their risks. The Apple/Google EN system was viewed as the most risky and as collecting
the most sensitive data; however, this technology was perceived as the easiest to decline
participation in and had similar privacy and security ratings to the government alternatives
which were generally viewed as more trustworthy and as only collecting necessary data.
Regardless of these differences, acceptance was very high for all tracking scenarios (>75% at
baseline) and surpassed 90% acceptance once additional privacy measures were included.
4.1. Policy Implications
Our results indicate that the introduction of mobile tracking technologies by the Tai-
wanese government or trusted corporate entities, such as Google and Apple, would be
supported by young Taiwanese adults. Results reflect attitudes towards tracking tech-
nologies when COVID-19 cases were approaching zero in Taiwan, and therefore, may be
considered as a baseline for COVID-19 tracking acceptance. Given the privacy calculus (i.e.,
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the weighing of risks and benefits when disclosing sensitive information), if cases were to
increase in Taiwan, we expect acceptance would similarly increase.
Acceptance was very high for all proposed tracking technologies and the technologies
did not differ greatly in their perceived benefits or risks to privacy and security. However,
participants displayed great concern for the health of others. These results suggest young
Taiwanese adults have a strong sense of communal responsibility to the public’s health, and
heavily weigh the public health benefits of mobile tracking technologies against the per-
sonal risks to privacy and security. However, this is not to say that privacy considerations
did not impact participants’ decision making.
Acceptability increased in each scenario with the inclusion of additional privacy
preserving measures, such as a sunset clause, opt-out option, or local storage option.
This suggests participants were actively weighing the risks and benefits of the tracking
technologies and engaging in privacy calculus. Furthermore, these results suggest that
policy makers who seek to increase tracking technology acceptance should not highlight the
technology itself (e.g., Bluetooth, telecommunication, GPS), and should instead highlight
the privacy measures that accompany these technologies, as well as factors external to the
privacy calculus, such as usability and ongoing control over the data.
One factor of the Health Belief Model not addressed in our survey is the importance
of “calls to action” that encourage the public to engage in a health policy. For messaging
to be effective, policy makers must know what issues to purse in order to affect public
behaviors. Our findings show that as the threat from COVID-19 waned, concern for others
remained very high. This indicates that proactive public actions among young adults that
foster self-efficacy, such as downloading a tracking app, would be best incentivized when
framed as “protecting those most at risk”. Furthermore, online and print newspapers and
social media were the primary sources for COVID-19 information. We suggest government
advertising should focus their attentions on these media to rapidly affect public health
behaviors among young adults.
4.2. Broader Implications
The current research fits within a broader series of investigations into international
acceptance for COVID-19 tracking technologies. Although international results are still
being collated, our preliminary findings suggest that both tracking acceptance and concern
for others were generally higher among young Taiwanese adults than among representative
Australian [31] and United Kingdom [30] samples. Nevertheless, all countries show
increasing levels of tracking acceptance once additional privacy measures (e.g., a sunset
clause) are included, suggesting that privacy concerns and health surveillance similarly
trade-off regardless of culture and age.
These international comparisons must be interpreted with two important caveats:
(i) young Taiwanese adults may not be representative of all Taiwanese attitudes and (ii)
COVID-19 cases were fewer in Taiwan than in Australia or the United Kingdom. Lower
cases in Taiwan would suggest concern and acceptance should be lower than in countries
with greater case numbers (e.g., Australia or the United Kingdom), however this was not the
case. The elevated concern for others and higher technological acceptance in Taiwan relative
to Australia and the United Kingdom may reflect a communal responsibility to public
health that is absent in the comparatively individualistic Western cultures. Alternatively,
these findings may reflect attitudes common among young adults across countries and
cultures, but that appear amplified in Taiwan due to our sampling of young adults. Future
research may address these questions by assessing attitudes in a representative sample of
Taiwan and comparing attitudes across countries and cultures, while controlling for key
demographics, such as age and education.
4.3. Limitations
This study aimed to determine attitudes towards tracking technologies among young
Taiwanese adults, however, this scope presents a major limitation to our findings. For track-
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ing technologies to be most effective, acceptance must be relatively high among the entire
population, not just young adults. Telecommunication network tracking bypasses this
issue, working on all devices regardless of the user’s age or attitudes; however, voluntary
apps require the user’s consent and self-efficacy to be installed and used effectively. By tar-
geting young adults, we establish acceptance among a critical COVID-19 demographic that
may play a role in a second COVID-19 outbreak; however, we also limit the generalizability
of our findings.
Our findings were also limited by our sample size within each wave of data collection,
a necessary restriction due to financial constraints and the immediate need for data during
the early days of the pandemic. Fortunately, no major changes to the state of the pandemic
occurred in Taiwan during our four-week collection window, and public perceptions were
relatedly stable, allowing us to pool data across waves to provide an informative analysis.
However, future research would benefit by wider time intervals between waves and larger
samples therein, to assess how attitudes change over time. Additionally, future research
may also aim to establish the acceptability of tracking technologies in a representative
sample of the Taiwanese public, as the effectiveness of these technologies among the entire
population depends on their uptake among the wider public.
Finally, our study was limited to assessing three hypothetical tracking scenarios, a
small sample of the potential technological solutions now available [39]. By asking about
real-world technologies that were under consideration around the world, we explored a
range of different scenario dimensions, such as autonomy (mandatory vs. voluntary track-
ing), storage (centralized vs. decentralized), and data usage (government vs. corporate);
however, this study design cannot independently assess the effect of these elements on
acceptability judgments. Future research may narrow its focus of investigation to these
specific elements to better understand their impact on the participant’s acceptance of
privacy-encroaching tracking technologies.
5. Conclusions
When sampled through a series of four surveys, we found young Taiwanese adults
were very accepting of three hypothetical COVID-19 tracking technologies: a government
app, telecommunication network tracking, and the Apple/Google Bluetooth exposure
notification system. Acceptance increased further with the inclusion of privacy-preserving
measures, such as a sunset clause or local data storage option, and was generally higher
than tracking acceptance in Western countries, such as the United Kingdom [30] and
Australia [31]. In lieu of a vaccine, these tracking technologies offer one solution that allows
for normal social contact among young adults, while ensuring they can be rapidly notified
to stop the virus’ spread if they encounter an infected individual. However, for these
technologies to be most effective, future research must seek to establish their acceptability
among the entire population. We hope that this study can prove informative to decision
makers not only in Taiwan, but in other countries with similar cultures and attitudes
towards privacy and public health that are attempting to arrest the spread of COVID-19.
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Appendix A. Resilience and World View
The following appendix displays results to survey items that were deemed supple-
mental to the main investigation. We display these in the interest of transparency to the
reader, however, note that these results did not meaningfully contribute to the conclusions
displayed in the main study. In summary, psychological resilience and political worldview
did not play an important role in the acceptance of tracking technologies, potentially due
to the homogeneity of the sample and generally high levels of resilience.
Appendix A.1. Resilience
After providing consent and demographic information, participants completed the
Connor–Davidson resilience scale (CD-RISC). The CD-RISC is a 25-item scale designed to
measure how well people deal with the adversity of stressful events, tragedy, and trauma.
In Connor and Davidson’s initial study [32], the scale displayed a high degree of internal
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89) and test–retest reliability (Pearson’s r = 0.97). The
items sum to provide a measure of psychological resilience.
Appendix A.2. World View
At the conclusion of each survey, participant’s world views were examined using
three items on a 7-point scale, (e.g., 1 = Strongly agree, 7 = Strongly disagree), measuring
the endorsement of small governments and the utility of the free market (greater agreement
indicated more conservative/libertarian worldviews). These items are summarized in
Table A1.
Table A1. Items assessing world view (Wview).
Item Question Label
Wview 1
An economic system based on free markets unrestrained by




The free market system may be efficient for resource
allocation but it is limited in its
capacity to promote social justice.
Social justice
Wview 3 The government should interfere with the lives of citizensas little as possible. Small government
Appendix A.3. Results
The ability to cope with stress and trauma during the pandemic may influence (i) how
one perceives the severity of the pandemic, and (ii) the perceived risks and benefits of using
tracking technologies. Indeed, recent research suggests resilience is associated with less
concern about the pandemic and lower level of generalized anxiety and depression [40],
which may influence whether tracking technologies are perceived to be necessary or
beneficial to public health.
Resilience was measured by the Connor–Davidson resilience scale which ranges from
0 (no resilience) to 100 (high resilience). Resilience scores were moderate to high (M = 62,
SD = 12), suggesting participants were psychologically capable of dealing with the stresses
and changes associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. We conducted an exploratory
analysis and correlated our measure or resilience with items measuring COVID-risk,
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tracking benefits, tracking risks, and tracking acceptance. Results showed small significant
(Bonferroni corrected p’s < 0.001) Pearson’s correlations between psychological resilience
and the perception that tracking technologies will reduce the likelihood of contraction,
aid in a return to normal activities, and reduce the virus’ spread (r = 0.15, 0.19, and 0.17,
respectively). Resilience similarly correlated with trust that data privacy and data security
would be preserved, and the perception of ongoing control over one’s data (r = 0.12, 0.13,
and 0.1, respectively). The same results were observed using Spearman correlations and no
significant correlations were observed between tracking acceptability and psychological
resilience.
Libertarian political worldviews, such as the endorsement of small governments
and the free market, may be correlated negatively with trust in one’s government and
the acceptability of tracking technologies. We find weak significant (Bonferroni correct
p’s < 0.01) negative correlations between libertarian worldviews and concern for others and
one’s self from COVID-19 (r = −0.13 and −0.18, respectively), and acceptance for tracking
technologies (r = −0.13). The same results were found using Spearman correlations.
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Appendix B.2. English Version (Translated; not Presented in the Experiment)
The government app scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing
the virus’ spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system,
the economy, and save many lives. The Taiwanese Government might consider
using smartphone tracking data to identify and contact those who may have been
exposed to people with COVID-19. This would help reduce community spread
by identifying those most at risk and allowing health services to be appropriately
targeted. Only people that downloaded a government app and agreed to be
tracked and contacted would be included in the project. The more people that
download and use this app the more effectively the Government would be able
to contain the spread of COVID-19. Data would be stored in an encrypted format
on a secure server accessible only to the Taiwanese Government. Data would
only be used to contact those who might have been exposed to COVID-19.”
The telecommunication network tracking scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing
the virus’ spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system, the
economy, and save many lives. The Taiwanese Government might consider using
phone tracking data supplied by telecommunication companies to identify and
contact those who may have been exposed to people with COVID-19. This would
help reduce community spread by identifying those most at risk and allowing
health services to be appropriately targeted. All people using a mobile phone
would be included in the project, with no possibility to opt-out. Data would be
stored in an encrypted format on a secure server accessible only to the Taiwanese
Government who may use the data to locate people who were violating lockdown
orders and enforce them with fines and arrests where necessary. Data would also
be used to inform the appropriate public health response and to contact those
who might have been exposed to COVID-19, and individual quarantine orders
could be made on the basis of this data.”
And the Bluetooth (Apple/Google API) scenario was described as:
“The COVID-19 pandemic has rapidly become a worldwide threat. Containing
the virus’ spread is essential to minimize the impact on the healthcare system,
the economy, and save many lives. Apple and Google have proposed adding a
contact tracing capability to existing smartphones to help inform people if they
have been exposed to others with COVID-19. This would help reduce community
spread of COVID-19 by allowing people to voluntarily self-isolate. When two
people are near each other, their phones would connect via Bluetooth. If a person
is later identified as being infected, the people they have been in close proximity
to are then notified without the government knowing who they are. The use of
this contact tracing capability would be completely voluntary. People who are
notified would not be informed who had tested positive.”
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